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introduction
Since 2003, until the end of Luis Inácio Lula s´ da Silva term as Brazilian 
President in 2010, one of the most controversial issues of the country s´ foreign 
policy was the status of bilateral relations with the US. For some, they have grown 
weaker because of Brazil’s “new options”, the reinforcement of the South-South 
cooperation axis;, for others, the alliance has grown stronger due to the strength 
of our political, diplomatic and economic profile. 
The polarization of these evaluations stretched to the whole of Brazil s´ 
external performance and reflects classical traditions of foreign policy, the bilateral-
hemispheric (1902/1961) and the global multilateral (1961/1989). After the end of 
the Cold War, these traditions have clashed as a choice between the past and the 
future and reached their peak at Lula’s two-term Presidency. From 1989 to 1999, 
the bilateral hemispheric option was dominant and, since 1999, the nation has been 
experiencing the comeback of the global multilateral view, in particular after 2003. 
From this period on, Brazil s´ progresses in the world are significant, strengthening 
the South-South and North-South axis of our International Relations.
Examining the facts, the easy criticisms of the global multilateral option 
do not hold still and fail to understand the new role that Brazil is playing. This 
role cannot be linked almost exclusively to an alignment with the US (either 
pragmatic or automatic), but as part of an international system that shows traces 
of multipolarity and significant dynamics of multilateral alliances and institutions. 
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Facing this scenario, joined by Brazil’s choices in the last few years, the aim 
of this article is to argue that Brazil-US bilateral relations have grown stronger. 
It is also going to discuss the idea that growing “stronger” does not mean total 
convergence of ideas or interests, but a reality of building mutual understanding 
with shared views on some issues, respecting differences of opinion. In addition, 
the “Strategic Dialogue” established in 2005 represents US recognition of Brazil’s 
stature in South America and the world; that situation, as in many other US 
bilateral relations (such as the ones with similar emerging nations as China and 
India), means, as well, an attempt to engage and contain these poles. Therefore, 
it’s necessary to examine these complex patterns, presenting a balance of Brazil-
US bilateral relations from 2003-2010.
a brief background: The 1990s
In January 2003, when Lula came into power, Brazil-US bilateral relations 
were facing a period of relative distancing, characterized by the absence of 
both crises and progresses. In 1999, still during Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s 
(FHC) administration (1995/2002) and the last couple of years of Bill Clinton’s 
(1993/2000) Presidency and the beginning of George W. Bush s´ term (2001/2008), 
the Brazilian nation had slowly begin to adjust its agenda of foreign policy. This 
adjustment was symbolized by “asymmetric globalization” and projects of regional 
integration in South America. These policies were a break from the pattern of 
alignment that prevailed in the previous decade and were deeply criticized by 
some interest groups in the country.
Brazil-US bilateral relations during the 1990s, regardless of Itamar Franco s´ 
administration (1992/1994), were characterized by the revival of the “special 
alliance”, based on some assessments: the idea that Brazilian foreign policy in 
the 1960s-1970s promoted the nation’s isolation in the world; that this situation 
caused its economic and political crisis of the 1980s due to a strategy of “autonomy 
through exclusion”; and that the country was weak. It was necessary to link its 
future to the US once more, as in the first half of the 20th century, leading to 
“autonomy through integration”. Last, but not least, this was the “only” choice, 
since the US was the hegemonic power in the unipolar order created after the 
end of the Cold War.
From the “lost decade”, Brazil entered the “bilateral decade”, translated 
into the adoption of the economic prescriptions of the neoliberal Washington 
Consensus and of several regimes in the area of dual technologies (in particular 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty), the environment and human rights. The nation 
abandoned its national security priorities, depleting its Armed Forces, and its 
projects of development based on import substitution and the goal of being a 
middle power. During Fernando Collor de Mello’s brief tenure (1990/1992), 
alignment was automatic, and, in the first term of FHC (1995/1998) the pragmatic 
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stance prevailed. Even though similar in logic (compliance to the main stream 
US agenda and, therefore, to the First World1), Collor’s and FHC’s tactics were 
different, since FHC envisioned the country as a regional power and Collor worked 
from a perception of weakness. 
FHC’s prospects of recognition were sustained by Brazil’´ s regional stature 
and its “responsible and legitimate” foreign policy, and benefited from “Plano 
Real”, the stabilization plan that put an end to the economic crisis. Two main 
objectives were envisioned: the permanent seat at the UN Security Council and 
fair and open trade in regional and global terms. Brazil s´ aim was to be a relevant 
player at the World Trade Organization (WTO), advancing agricultural talks 
from 1995 onwards and, in the region, in the Free Trade Area of the Americas 
(FTAA) talks. Launched in 1994, the FTAA project recovered US Latin American 
ideas of former President George H. Bush (1989/1992) proposing the creation 
of a hemispheric free trade area and good governance in the Enterprise for the 
Americas Initiative (EAI). In 1990/1991, the only results of the EAI were related 
to debt relief (Brady Plan) and the creation of NAFTA (North American Free 
Trade Agreement).
In neither of these scenarios Brazil gained its objectives and, although its 
efforts were clearly directed to promote good relations with the US (President 
Clinton and FHC did share excellent friendship), no benefits resulted from the 
reborn special alliance. Also, in 1998, in a context of economic crisis due to the 
failure of the neoliberal agenda, after his reelection, FHC promoted the adjustments 
mentioned. Which were the contents of these policies, asymmetric globalization 
and regional integration, that stretched, in some manner, to the next period? 
The purpose of “asymmetric globalization” was to offer “constructive 
criticism” of globalization showing the need for adjustments in international 
governance and aid2. As Vizentini (2008) points out, Cardoso’s move was more 
of a tactical, trying to recover its space in the First World and towards the US, 
than of a strategic nature. Although there was not a full recovery of the global-
multilateral tradition, there was a more realistic account of the international system 
balance of power and Brazil’s priorities. In relation to this balance, the perception 
of American unipolarity (which remained only in military terms) was replaced 
by the recognition of a trend towards multipolarity due to US relative economic 
decline and the consolidation of other poles such as China, EU, Japan, India, Russia 
and South Africa. Brazil should turn its focus to these areas of opportunities, in 
particular amongst developing nations and South America, also was being hit 
hard by the neoliberal crisis. 
1 Other concepts that can be linked to this idea are the search for the “normalization” of the State and 
peripheral realism. (CERVO, 2008)
2 SILVA, 2009 offers an interesting account of FHC s´ foreign policy evolution
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FHC’s promoted the revival of Mercosur3 and the Integration of South 
American Regional Infrastructure (IIRSA), thus recovering the idea of the South 
American Free Trade Area (SAFTA4). IIRSA invested in projects of infrastructure, 
focusing on strategic sectors such as energy, transports, communication trying 
to reignite development. The project was launched in 2000 at the Brasilia 
Presidential Summit and was also a response to US initiatives that were recovering 
an interventionist stance at that same year: Plan Colombia, to help Colombia 
fight drug dealers and eradicate production of cocaine, which allowed the US to 
maintain troops in this country; and US growing criticism of autonomous actions 
in South America, including Brazilian foreign policy and the rebirth of the left, 
represented by Hugo Chávez in Venezuela and in many other nations, linked to 
neo-liberalism crisis. 
Plan Colombia, and other US policies of this period (1998/1999) such as new 
pressures on Iraq were related mostly to domestic issues in the US, such as President 
Clinton’s process of impeachment due to the Monica Lewisnki scandal,the growth 
of the neoconservative right, and the pending 2000 Presidential elections. No 
particular attention was directed to Brazil or Latin America, and processes like 
the FTAA and NAFTA stood still, once the US focused on strategic issues its 
internal agenda and in Eurasia. Republican George W. Bush’s election in 2000 
brought no changes, even though in his campaign he mentioned reviving the 
FTAA and giving more attention to the hemisphere (symbolized in his “America’s 
Century” proposal). 
W. Bush’s goals were directed to Eurasia, holding a unilateral stance that 
devalued multilateral organizations, cooperation and non-security issues such 
as trade. Not only Brazil, but all nations were viewed as second rank partners, 
even traditional allies in Western Europe. These trends were deepened by 
9/11/2001, the following Global War on Terror (GWT), the military operations 
in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003). Summing up this agenda, the 2002 
National Security Strategy became known as the Bush Doctrine, stating that 
the US could act in a preventive and preemptive manner in the world. For Latin 
America this meant a focus on security issues: enlargement of Plan Colombia and 
the fight against “narcoterror” symbolized by Colombian Revolutionary Armed 
Forces (FARC); also it meant studies for the installation of Military Bases in 
the region and the definition of Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay common border 
(“Tríplice Fronteira”) as a place of illicit activities ranging from terrorism to 
3 In 1990/1991, the creation of Mercosur by Collor was linked to the neoliberal agenda and US projects. 
Supported by Menem in Argentina, the acceleration of the process of strengthening political and economic 
ties in the Southern Cone incorporated Paraguay and Uruguay. After Collor left power in 1992, Mercosur 
became the first priority of Brazilian foreign policy, and regained an autonomous profile.
4 In 1993, SAFTA was Itamar Franco s´ government answer to US initiatives in the region and a means to 
reinforce Brazil s´ compromise within South America and Meercosur.
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organized crime. Brazilian diplomacy refuted all these accusations and refused 
to define FARC as a terrorist group.
Tough US distancing from Brazil was interpreted by some in the country 
as a result of FHC’s changing tactics. In the last year of FHC’s government, a 
division that would gain significant ideological weight in the next administration 
of Luis Inacio Lula da Silva was to begin. This group viewed South American 
integration, asymmetric globalization and new partnerships in the South as a 
break in the nation’s commitment towards modernization and the First World 
(i.e alignment). These circles, in the next government, identified themselves as 
“Americanists”, defenders of the bilateral hemispheric tradition and the vertical 
axis of IR. Other options of engagement, such as the global-multilateral, were 
narrowly defined as “non-americanist”. 
This polarization was still based on assumptions that were dominant in the 
1990s, of Brazil’s weakness and US strength, and also sustained its arguments in 
other political misconceptions regarding US foreign policy: (a) the direction of its 
priorities in the world, which since 1945 were very distant from its hemisphere; (b) 
the idea that the initiatives of the 1990s such as the EAI, NAFTA and the FTAA 
were designed to break the 1823 Monroe Doctrine (“America for the Americans”) 
leading to cooperation, ignoring the fact that they were linked to US economic 
decline and the need to try to secure regional markets, worldwide confronted by 
Western Europe and Asia (Japan and China), preserving its sphere of influence; 
(c) the fact that the US was opening its markets and was compromised with trade 
multilateral talks despite since the 1980s protectionism and subsidies dominated its 
agenda coordinated by the Legislative, without differences amongst republicans or 
democrats and, at last, (d) the idea that the bilateral relation was a “one-way street” 
and that the US would change its views of Brazil due to its alignment. Quite the 
opposite, since the US tends to respect power, and not subordinate nations that 
cannot exercise regional roles. 
There was a deep exaggeration of criticism directed to FHC’s foreign policy 
that did not hold still. From 1999-2002, there were no great conflicts or advances 
in bilateral relations since neither one of the partners focused on each other. There 
were no benefits, but also no conflicts. And, from 1990-1998, no benefits came 
through either, although Brazil was showing a policy of alignment. Nevertheless, 
this fact was ignored and the pro-America coalition continued to defend the 
comeback of alignment. To make matters even worse for this group, the prospects 
of bilateral relations were worrisome.
In 2002, Brazilian Presidential elections were viewed with some concern by 
the US since the favorite candidate in polls was Luis Inácio Lula da Silva from the 
Workers Party (PT), who had already been a Presidential candidate in 1989, 1994 
and 1998 elections. For the neocons, Lula’s advance was seen as part of a dangerous 
“turn to the left” that Latin America was experiencing, influenced by the anti-
hegemonic project of Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez and his “socialism for 
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the 21st century”. In the heated environment of US politics and Bush’s preventive 
doctrine, there were some hypotheses concerning the birth of a “Latin axis of 
evil”, similar to the “axis of evil” of “rogue states” composed by Iran, Iraq and 
North Korea, identified as threats to US national security and world’s stability. 
This “Latin axis”, according to The Washington Times, a small newspaper linked 
to US radical right was composed of Venezuela, Cuba and Brazil.
Although leftist projects in Latin America were linked to the failure of 
neoliberalism and alignment trying to recover the economic and social agenda 
of the countries in the region, its tactics were different. Whereas Hugo Chavez 
in Venezuela, seen as the leader of this emerging bloc by the US had an anti-
hegemonic stance, Lula in Brazil argued in favor of social democratic reforms. 
High level contacts in 2002 and 2003 among Brazil and the US, including Lula’s 
team after election eliminated these doubts since the political and economic 
agenda to be followed showed some important level of continuity. This trend 
was also accompanied by adjustments in Brazil s´ policies framework, ending the 
alignments of the “bilateral decade”.
a comprehensive Foreign policy (2003/2010)
Not only Brazil, but several other nations in Latin America, Africa, Eastern 
Europe and Asia went through the 1990s with policies of alignment towards 
the US, including Russia, the former superpower of the Cold War. In a similar 
fashion, these nations were hit hard by crisis and the lack of political, economical 
and strategic benefits from the US, reflecting the preservation of asymmetries in 
multilateral talks and the absence of reform in international organizations. Faced 
by these constraints, these nations opted for significant changes in their domestic 
and foreign policies from the 2000s onwards. A new stance of pride and bargaining 
in International Relations was strengthened, generating new alliances amongst 
them and a different autonomous view of the US, which, for its part, is confronted 
by its own relative decline, altering the world’s balance of power.
For Brazil, the beginning of Lula’s administration represented a turning point 
which impacted the nation’s stature and its role in the international system. In the 
particular instance of Brazil-US bilateral relations, its evolution can be divided 
in three phases since 2003 until 2010: 2003-2005refers to the first two years of 
Brazil s´ new presidency and W. Bush’s peak of unilateralism; 2005-2008 are the 
years of Bush’s crisis and reform in the US and of Brazil’s power consolidation; 
and 2009 onwards, Barack Obama´ s beginning of mandate and Lula’s term to end.
2003/2005: regaining brazil’s national power
In this period, Brazil focused on recovering the global-multilateral tradition, 
adding new strong components to its agenda. This agenda was conducted by Celso 
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Amorim at the Ministry of External Relations and Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães 
as Secretary General of External Relations (2003-2009), since the beginning of 
Lula’s term. From 2009 onwards Guimarães has been ahead of the Secretary of 
Strategic Affairs and Antonio Patriota, former Brazilian Ambassador to the US 
(2007/2009), was named Secretary General. Lula also exercised an important role 
in Presidential Diplomacy, as a representative from the Third World.
One of the most significant changes was not only the recovery of the 
global multilateral agenda, but also as Vizentini s´ (2008) points out, the new 
social dimension that was brought to diplomatic speech (fight against hunger 
and poverty, debt relief, disease control) and its assertive stature. To this social 
dimension, political and economical demands such as the reform of International 
Organizations and equal and fair trade were added. Brazil was no longer trying 
to “belong” to the First World, but to reaffirm its place as a leader of emerging 
nations. Instead of giving priority to the North-South vertical axis of foreign 
policy, the country focused on its traditional South-South horizontal relations with 
similar nations such as India, China, Russia and South Africa, and less developed 
countries (LDC). The affirmative projection on South-South relations increased 
Brazil s´ bargain power towards the North, including the US.
Since 2003 Brazil invested in a serious of alliances of variable design: IBSA 
(India, Brazil and South Africa Dialogue Forum, for economic, political and 
technical cooperation); the G4 (Brazil, India, Germany and Japan for UNSC 
enlargement for new permanent members)5; and both G20s (trade and finance). 
The “trade” G20 was created in 20036, for the WTO Cancún Ministerial meeting, 
and the “finance” G20 gained new stance after 2008 due to US crisis (it was 
created in 1999). At the UN, Brazil is ahead of the United Nations Mission of 
Stabilization to Haiti (MINUSTAH).
Brazil put forward its projects regarding South American integration, 
following FHC’s agenda, such as IIRSA, but with a strong political component 
of autonomy. The South American Community of Nations (SACN) was created, 
later on renamed Union of South American Nations (Unasur), and Mercosur was 
strengthened with new agreements and talks in progress in the region and with 
international partners such as the EU, Israel, SACU (South Africa Customs Union) 
and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). The South 
American and Arab Countries Summit (ASPA) and the South American Africa 
Summit (ASA) were held in Brazil. After 2007, the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and 
China) begun to be defined as the new pillars of world order as emerging nations, 
5 Brazil is supported by Russia (in exchange for Brazil s´ support to Russian candidacy to the WTO), China, 
France and Great Britain. US stance will be discussed ahead.
6 The “trade” G20 was led by Brazil and had as its members other developing and less developed nations 
such as China, India, Argentina, Chile, South Africa, Mexico, and represented a clear coalition of countries 
from the South.
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beginning its process of institutionalization with two Summits (Yekaterinburg, 
2009, and Brasilia, 2010). 
Brazil-US bilateral relations in this first phase showed the same pattern of 
1999-2002: absence of great conflicts and of significant progress. Although the 
US remained, until 2009, when it was replaced by China, the most important 
individual trade partner of Brazil, the paths chosen by the Bush administration set 
the US apart from its major partners during his initial term, in which unilateralism 
prevailed. Bilateral relations were included in this framework, in regard to the 
WTO, the FTAA and multilateralism. WTO and FTAA talks that extended 
to Lula’s government benefited strongly from this foreign policy of autonomy, 
portraying a new strategic role for Brazil. This role sustained by demands of 
trade openness and fairness was not a complete break from FHC s´ last couple of 
years. Nevertheless, Brazil was accused by the US, and by opposition groups in 
the nation (the “Americanists” which became to be portrayed quite more often 
in the media, openly criticizing the government), of being responsible for both 
talks deadlocks in this period. Let s´ examine both issues:
– WTO – Since the creation of the WTO in 1995 and its First Ministerial 
Meeting, in Singapore, a clear pattern of talks emerged after the General Agreement 
on Trade and Tariffs Uruguay Round (GATT) represented by developed nations’ 
lack of compromise in discussing agricultural issues (also supported by the Peace 
Clause, that imposed restrictions on agricultural panels till 2003), added to new 
pressures on developing countries to open their services markets. There was 
relative frustration since many nations such as Brazil, at the height of its alignment 
agenda, opened their markets for industrial good and were still unable to sell 
their agricultural products due to tariffary and non-tariffary barriers, subsidies 
and protectionism from the North. Also “autonomy through integration” showed 
no results in FHC’s administration. Moreover, in 1999, at the failed Millennium 
Round in Seattle, developing nations were accused of being competitive because 
they did not abide to environmental and labor standards. 
At the “rebirth” of WTO, the Doha Development Round (DDR), Brazil 
once more resisted these pressures and, in 2003, these divergences reached their 
peak at the Cancún Ministerial Meeting and after the end of the Peace Clause, 
Brazil intensified its diplomatic actions in WTO panels against the US and the 
EU. At Cancún, Brazil’s leadership of the G20 coalition was criticized by US 
diplomacy in the immediate aftermath. Cancún repeated WTO’s talks dynamics, 
with developed nations pressing for concessions and developing ones resisting. 
The US and the EU tried to break G20’s alignment, but the alliance sustained its 
compromises. Robert Zoellick, head of the USTR at that moment, called Brazil 
“the country which only said no”, repeating the pattern of “blaming” our diplomacy 
for the failures of talks, although US focus was solely directed to the GWT at that 
point of the Bush presidency. He mentioned that G20 would certainly have a short 
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spam of life. Zoellick’s critics were repeated in Brazil widely, but fell short. Not 
only G20 survived until 2010, but had proven capable of sustaining its demands. 
Different from the FTAA, the process of WTO talks and negotiations is still 
ongoing. The DDR remains open and nations continue to confront themselves in 
the panels conducted by the organization. The prospects of the DDR were also 
affected by the 2008 economic crisis, which favored US and EU protectionist 
policies. Although arguments related to the WTO tend to focus on Brazil-US 
bilateral relations, diplomatic clashes are not only directed to the US, but also to 
the EU. On the other hand, FTAA talks were centered on Brazil and the US, in 
spite of the rhetoric of hemispheric trade.
– FTAA – The same pattern of Brazil’s resistance, and US negatives and 
pressures, extended to these talks. The first phase of Brazil-US bilateral relations 
under Lula was characterized by a very important period, when Brazil and the US 
shared the command of the negotiating process. At that time, 2003/2005, talks 
were already at crossroads, reflecting the absence of progress that was characterizing 
the whole project since its launch in 1994. Even then, with Brazil’s alignment in 
place, FHC government defended stances that, as in the WTO arena, showed that 
the nation’s compromises in trade were limited by some boundaries that reflected 
pragmatic economic interests. 
Brazil and the US shared significant differences regarding the framework of 
talks and hemispheric arrangements. The US supported the FTAA to encompass 
all regional arrangements, so organizations such as Mercosur and the Andean 
Pact would cease to exist. Brazil argued in favor of preserving these ties and that 
the FTAA should be a composition of them (building blocs). Brazil demanded to 
link the FTAA agenda to WTO talks. Moreover, there was a clash regarding the 
pattern of talks and implementation of decisions: Brazil preferred single harvest, 
that meant that all issues and resolutions should be implemented at the end of 
all talks, and the US the early harvest, with the gradual provision of rules. US 
options were intended to put pressure on Brazil in order to reform its economy 
and open markets, in particular the attempt to separate regional and global talks. 
Even if Brazil was trying to sustain a special relation with the US, autonomous 
trends of foreign policy remained, leading to a mixed position by the government, 
trying to defend the FTAA and Mercosur at the same time. During the whole 
process, the US clearly stated that it would not negotiate issues regarding its farm 
subsidies or protectionist practices and refused to address talks regarding products 
such as orange juice, soy, ethanol, cotton, tobacco, and others. Since the agenda was 
restricted from the beginning, the process was relatively doomed to fail, extremely 
constrained by US domestic policies and economic interests. 
FTAA talks from 1994 to 1999 were held in one Summit (Santiago, 1998) and 
five Ministerial Meetings (Denver and Cartagena 1996, Belo Horizonte 1997, Costa 
Rica 1998 and Toronto 1999). Another issue during this period that concerned 
Brazil was Clinton’s inability to gain the fast track mandate. In the US, trade talks 
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are a responsibility of the Legislative. Unless the White House obtains fast track, 
all decisions should be submitted to Congress afterwards, which limits credibility. 
US talks with Brazil were accompanied by appeals to members of Mercosur, such 
as Argentina, trying to weaken the bloc, and Brazil which was its leader. Argentina 
held a pendular stance, going back and forth Mercosur and the US. 
In 2001-2002, when FHC left power, three Ministerial Meetings (Buenos 
Aires, Quito e Miami) and one Summit were held (Quebec, 2001). Clearly, the 
US had abandoned the project and Brazil sustained its previous position. It should 
be stressed that Bush even got fast track for these negotiations (renamed, TPA, 
Trade Promotion Authority), but trade and other multilateral issues were put at bay.
From 2003-2005, the US and Brazil shared the command of talks and 
there were no consensus until 2005, the proposed date to end negotiations. Two 
Summits, Monterrey (2004) and Mar del Plata (2005), were held but although 
there was a Brazilian attempt of proposing a “light FTAA” the process stood 
still. Bush’s trade record in the region and the world is precarious for these issues 
were not viewed as priorities. The only US “advances” were bilateral agreements 
with small Latin American nations and CAFTA (Central American Free Trade 
Agreement) in which no concessions were needed. Latin America was second rank 
of US interests, focused on Eurasia, the ongoing Afghan war and the pending 
Iraqi conflict. The power vacuum in the Americas strengthened Brazil’s South 
American projects and Venezuelan ones represented by the Bolivarian Alternative 
for the Americas (ALBA). 
Either in the WTO or the FTAA talks, the crossroads was not Brazil’s “fault” 
but part of more complex reality of US interests. Brazil clearly was searching for 
new opportunities, recovering its diplomatic stature and preserving its autonomy. 
These stances have broken the pattern of reducing bilateral relations, and even 
Brazil’s International Relations as a whole, to economic and trade issues, a trend 
that prevailed in the 1990s linked to the concept of “normalization”. Political 
and strategic matters were recovered, along the social agenda, envisioning a 
growing role. 
This period also represented the process of UN talks regarding the Iraq 
War7, that ended with US invasion, supported by the “Coalition of the Willing”, 
composed by nations such as Great Britain, Spain, Portugal, Poland. Brazil stood 
along with France, Russia and Germany in the defense of the multilateral system, 
which also represented a rift in this period. Bush’s unilateralism distanced the 
US from many other partners, including Brazil, with direct consequences for its 
hegemony. Summing up 2003-2005, Brazil and the US followed separate paths 
with very different results for both countries and their relations in the second 
phase, 2005-2008. 
7 In 1990, Brazil supported “Operation Desert Storm” against Saddam Hussein as part of a multinational 
effort supported by the UNSC. Nevertheless, the country did not send troops to the Gulf, as Argentina.
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2005/2008: a re-Start
Lula´ s first term represented the strengthening of Brazil s´ external projection 
and a leap forward in South America and the world, a growth similar to the one 
led by its BRIC partners. Once more, the nation was to be praised as a relevant 
power pole in the region, the world and multilateral organizations, recovering 
its Third World leadership. After 2005 and Bush’s reelection, the US showed 
opposite signs: isolation, weakness, crisis and overstretch, leading to a change in 
its relation to the world trying to share the burdens of its choices. US “comeback 
to multilateralism” was a product of its relative decline, conducted by former head 
of the National Security Council Condoleezza Rice, who became Secretary of 
State after Colin Powell s´ exit. First it was only a reaction to negative trends. With 
the worsening of US crisis in 2007/2008, it gained strategic meaning, laying the 
ground for the next administration of Barack Obama (2009/).
What did this mean for Brazil and bilateral relations? From 2005 onwards, 
the US started a process of rapprochement with is regional allies, Brazil included. 
Brazil was visited in 2005 by both Rice and Bush (and Lula and Bush shared a 
very good personal relation such as Clinton and FHC had previously). This year 
of 2005 represented the official beginning of Brazil-US strategic dialogue, which 
meant that bilateral relations would embody regional and global issues. To stress 
the meaning of “Strategic Dialogue”, it should be remembered that the US only 
shares this kind of dialogue with nations such as China, India and Great Britain. 
Brazil was invited to Middle East talks and, in South America, it offered an 
alternative to Chávez. 
Lula was already seen by America s´ diplomacy as a “responsible leader” of 
the left, accompanied by Michelle Bachelet in Chile. Chávez was still viewed 
as dangerous, as his influence spread across the Andean region to Equator and 
Bolivia, with the elections of Presidents Rafael Correa and Evo Morales. Only 
President Alvaro Uribe’s Colombia was clearly aligned to the US. It was Brazil, the 
most relevant power pole in South America, the one that could work as a regional 
balancer and an honest broker. Addressing the Strategic Dialogue, President Lula 
stated that,
When I was elected for Presidency, several people anticipated the deterioration of 
Brazil-US relations. They were completely wrong. Quite the opposite, our relations 
are, nowadays, facing one of their best moments. Economic and trade relations were 
enlarged and our political dialogue gained a high level. We both understand, the 
US and Brazil, our political and economic importance and the responsibilities that 
come from this (...) For all these reasons, we are very enthusiastic that the US is 
willing to include Brazil among the countries with which it maintains a privileged 
strategic dialogue. At this landmark (...) US-Brazil relations are significant and its 
improvement is a legacy for the ones who will come forward (SILVA, 2005, s/p)
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Patriota (2008) mentions that this Dialogue represents the maturing 
of bilateral relations and the balanced mix of converging and diverging ideas 
that are common to power relations among great nations. WTO talks and the 
reform of multilateral organizations showed no progress in this second phase, 
Brazilian products8 still face barriers on the US markets, such as antidumping 
and fitossanitary measures, additional import tariffs and subsidies to American 
producers in several areas. Patriota indicates that this situation offers a significant 
toll on Brazilian exports and slows the growth of bilateral trade. Brazil has been 
more active in other markets, mainly amongst South countries. As Lima (2005) 
points out, one of the most relevant aspects of Lula’s agenda was this diversification 
of markets. This search of alternatives allowed Brazil to be less vulnerable to the 
world economic crisis in 2008. In relation to the US, Table 1 below shows the 
trade patterns of the last decade.
Table 1
brazilian Trade brazil and united States uS$ Fob
year
export uS$ Fob
(a)
import uS$ Fob
(b)
balance results
(a-b)
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010**
10.675.124.224
13.189.576.929
14.208.572.954
15.377.822.589
16.728.079.047
20.099.235.400
22.539.731.875
24.524.748.523
25.065.048.412
27.423.048.799
15.601.628.031
8.953.658.378
11.741.047.942
12.899.226.083
12.905.492.013
10.287.452.316
9.569.454.702
11.357.061.637
12.666.508.176
14.657.479.678
18.723.280.625
25.627.961.850
20.030.382.627
12.075.872.253
-1.065.923.718
290.350.846
1.303.080.941
5.090.370.273
7.158.624.345
8.742.173.763
9.873.223.699
9.867.268.845
6.341.767.787
1.795.086.949
-4.428.754.596
-3.122.213.875
Source: SECEX
** Calculado até o mês de junho
In the security arena, the US maintained Plan Colombia, the alert in “Tríplice 
Fronteira” and the 4th Fleet was put to work again with ships patrolling the South 
Atlantic. The region of the South Atlantic, since the mid 1980s has been a focus 
8 See, in this regard, Barreiras a produtos brasileiros no mercado dos EUA. Embaixada do Brasil, Washington 
DC e FUNCEX. 2007. [http://www.funcex.com.br/material/estudos/Barreiras2007.pdf]. The products 
that most suffer barriers are: orange juice, ethanol, sugar, tobacco, chicken, pork and cow meat, fruits and 
vegetables and iron.
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of differences between Brazil and the US, as the country proposed the creation of 
ZOPACAs (South Atlantic Zone of Peace and Cooperation) and the US presented 
OTAS (South Atlantic Treaty Organization, similar to NATO). For Brazil, the 
goal is the defense of a demilitarized region, and for the US to gain new ground in 
the area. During the 1990s the debate reached a low point, but it came back due 
to the discovery of new oil and gas reserves by Brazil, “pre-salt” and Angola and 
the nation’s autonomy9. Environmental (the preservation of the Amazon, global 
warming, sustainable development), human rights and security issues are also 
present. Brazil sustained all its projects and the relation came forward. 
US recognition of Brazilian efforts was not the main goal of Lula’s policy, 
but was a natural development of the strengthening of our diplomacy. It showed 
a clear understanding of the international system trends towards multipolarity 
(power redistribution) and of the US. Any realistic account of US foreign policy 
indicates that, in history, this country values powerful partners, in particular in 
moments of crisis. The US, in fact, needs its partners to be stabilizers in each of 
their regions and tries to balance each one of these allies in different manners, 
in order to prevent their alliances against the US (“divide and conquer”). The 
Bush era deepened the process of counterbalance against the US (named soft 
balance by the American literature) due to its unipolarity: IBSA, trade G20, the 
Shangai Cooperation Organization are examples of these initiatives. Rice needed 
to recover these ties in order to prevent the deepening of this process, harmful to 
US hegemonic interests. 
In 2007, during President s´ Bush visit to Brazil, both countries signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding to Advance Cooperation on Biofuels that was 
presented as a very important step on bilateral cooperation. The Memorandum 
focused on joint research regarding biofuels, mainly ethanol, and on studies for 
the creation of an ethanol commodities market. Although opportunities in this 
area, including production in third party countries and environmental issues, 
are still being hailed as very significant, and Brazil has an important competitive 
advantage in sugar cane ethanol production, US markets still remain closed to 
our exports10. 
The ethanol issue is one of the most significant examples on how US markets 
can be closed to Brazilian products that are highly competitive, suffering two kinds 
of taxation: a 2,5% tax import and U$ 0,54 added per gallon. This second tariff 
per gallon will expire in January, 2011 and as Ambassador Vieira points out “the 
most likely scenarios are three: expiration of the tariff as scheduled; its renewal 
at the current value; or its renewal at 45 cents a gallon, on a par with the subsidy 
for blending ethanol with gasoline” (VIEIRA, 2010, p. 10). Although during his 
9 Brazil is also working to enlarge its national maritime borders due to this strategic oil reserves.
10 The pressure against Brazilian ethanol in the US come from a variety of sources: corn producers, from 
which US ethanol production derives, and the energy sector lobby (oil industry). 
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campaign in 2008 and soon afterwards US President Barack Obama regarded the 
development of biofuels and a new energy paradigm for the country as a priority, 
the reconversion of the American economy is slow.
In spite of trade barriers, strategically Brazil is being viewed by the US in a 
different light. In 2008, Rice included Brazil as a “stakeholder of international 
order” alongside China, India, Russia and South Africa. Rice also defined Brazil 
as a “regional leader and global partner”, stressing the relevance of its social agenda 
and the progress of the country as a “multiethnic diplomacy”. (RICE, 2005 and 
RICE, 2008). The support for UNSC enlargement was also present, but still loose. 
Analysts as Onis (2008), Stuphen and Hachigian (2008) and Zakaria (2008) 
stressed Brazil s´ and other emerging nations11 role in the world s´ balance of power, 
and the need for the US to deepen its relations with these “strategic partners”. The 
third phase of Brazil-US relations is rooted in these changes started by Bush and 
Rice, and continued by Democrat President Barack Obama.
2009 onwards: a regional Stabilizer and a Growing Global role
Since 2009, and in his campaign during 2008, Obama designed a program 
of domestic and international change for US leadership, in the midst of its deepest 
crisis since the Great Depression of 1929. Bush s´ policies led to an economic 
breakdown and political isolation that was deeply affecting American hegemony. 
Rice’s agenda managed to reverse some of these negative trends and its proposals 
were adopted by the future Obama presidency in its “smart power concept12”. The 
growing role of emerging nations, less affected by the crisis, gained relevance, and 
the finance G20 meetings of 2008-2009 were presented as examples of US new 
type of cooperation with other nations in dealing with the reform of economic 
institutions. Expectations extended to other multilateral forums and also in specific 
bilateral relations including Brazil.
Obama’s administration fell short, because once more the President focus 
had to be elsewhere than Latin America, Brazil or reform. US main demands were 
domestic and he had to deal with the GWT, and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
The promised leadership on the environment was not fulfilled, including the 
prospects on biofuels. Furthermore, he has to deal with constant opposition from 
Republicans and from his own party, which affect his ability to try to balance 
the reforms the US need. 
The fight over building bipartisanship consensus affects US ability and 
its legitimacy (leading to changing positions and clashes in some matters in 
international affairs between the State Department, the White House and the 
11 Khanna (2008) defines Brazil, China, Russia, India as leaders of the new “Second World”.
12 Smart power is a concept created by US academic Joseph Nye that combines hard and soft power into one, 
meaning the use of military, ideological, institutional, economical and other resources in a balanced manner.
Cristina Soreanu Pecequilo
146
Pentagon). In spite of winning the Nobel Prize in 2009, Obama, in the first year 
of his administration was unable to reach forward to US allies. Obama was only 
able to launch a new National Security Strategy (NSS-2010), promote the renewal 
of the Afghan mission and the withdrawal from Iraq in 2010.
What has this meant for bilateral relations under Lula’s Presidency? Here, it 
is necessary to make a separation between long term strategic issues and current 
affairs. 
In relation to current affairs, themes like the WTO and the FTAA stood 
still, as well as the reform of the UNSC, the G8, the IMF, the World Bank, 
and other institutions. Brazil and other emerging nations sustained a significant 
leadership in these issues. In bilateral terms, in 2009 one of the most significant 
disputes with the US was settled at WTO: in the cotton dispute Brazil was 
authorized by the WTO to retaliate the US in almost U$ 830 million. After a 
year of bilateral talks, in 2010 Brazil agreed to postpone the retaliation until 2012 
when the US promised to review its Farm Bills and illegal practices, and to the 
create a fund to help Brazilian producers (for a list of WTO’s Brazil’s panels check 
PECEQUILO, 2009).
The US sustained its bilateral policies with Cuba, Venezuela and Colombia 
from a hegemonic stand, mixing them with promises of engagement and dialogue: 
for Cuba, there was the temporary suspension of Helms Burton law, which imposed 
sanctions on companies that traded with this country until February 2010 and 
fewer restrictions on trading food and medicines and travels, but the embargo 
remained; in relation to Venezuela, US promises to engage Chávez went no 
further and in Colombia, the fight against drugs continued, added to the project 
of installing seven US military installations. In 2010, this project was rejected 
by Colombian Congress, after the end of Alvaro Uribe’s term and beginning of 
Alvaro Santos’s tenure.
The 4th Fleet revival was maintained and the US showed growing concern 
over autonomous actions from Unasur, mainly the newly created Council of South 
American Defense (CDS), and the growing presence of China in Latin America 
(and also the EU). In Haiti, after the earthquake, the US acted more decisively 
with MINUSTAH, but after the worst peak of the crisis, Brazil and the UN 
remained as pillars of engagement. The Honduran crisis represented a mixture 
of conflict and partnership, in particular due to US changing positions: after the 
Coup against Zelaya, Brazil and US condemned these actions and pressed for the 
return of the democratic legitimate order. After Honduran opposition resistance 
and Zelaya’s refuge in the Brazilian embassy, the US ended up supporting the 
coup whereas Brazil sustained its position. After the election that led Porfirio 
Lobo to power, the White House soon recognized the new administration and 
Brazil refused to. The crisis represented the difficulties of American diplomacy in 
sustaining a coherent stance and Brazil s´ new field of action in Central America, 
in which it later proposed the Community of Caribbean and Central American 
A New Strategic Dialogue: Brazil-US Relations in Lula’s Presidency (2003-2010)
Re
vi
st
a 
Br
as
ile
ir
a 
de
 P
ol
ít
ic
a 
In
te
rn
ac
io
na
l
147
States (CELAC), in which the US would not be participating (as in Unasur). In 
all these issues, OAS participation was minimum.
The same pattern repeated in Iran nuclear talks: Brazil and the US started as 
allies and ended following distinct paths; that ignited a new round of criticism by 
“Americanists”, since Brazil was “getting out of its league” and harming its bilateral 
relations. In the beginning of 2010, Brazil, Turkey and Iran closed a trilateral 
agreement regarding Iran’s nuclear program, which was initially supported by 
the White House in its new engagement policies. However, after closing the deal, 
Brazil and Turkey were criticized by the same US, which continued to seek UNSC 
sanctions against Iran’s nuclear program and unilateral actions, including threats 
of a military invasion made by some Pentagon high ranked officials. Brazil and 
Turkey sustained their stance, and the situation regarding nuclear proliferation 
in Iran is still ongoing as of the second semester of 2010.
Added to this, Brazil is slowly recovering its nuclear program and its Armed 
Forces potential. Brazil does not wish to become a military power, but is working 
to recover its defense capabilities and technological assets. Regarding the nuclear 
issue, the focus is to invest in uranium enrichment, for which the country has 
comparative advantages in uranium reserves and technology (Resende Plant) 
and the project of the nuclear submarine. The country has clearly established its 
compromises with the NPT, the Tlateloloco Treaty and other regimes from the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and still abides to defense of the 
development of sensitive technologies for peaceful use as in the 1960s. 
These episodes, and US periodical criticisms of Brazil s´ agenda, were held 
as proof of the alleged “failure” of the global multilateral option and the South-
South axis. Critics failed to understand the new stature of Brazilian diplomacy in 
the first decade of the 21st century vis à vis the US, other nations and multilateral 
institutions that means our steady involvement in a whole set of difficult and 
different issues. Therefore, we come to the long term strategic issues: in the real 
world, bilateral relations kept growing strong and, for the long run, Brazil and 
other emerging nations resilience is well recognized by the US, even in its new NSS,
The starting point for that collective action will be our engagement with other 
countries. The cornerstone of this engagement is the relationship between the United 
States and our close friends and allies in Europe, Asia, the Americas, and the Middle 
East – ties which are rooted in shared interests and shared values, and which serve 
our mutual security and the broader security and prosperity of the world. We are 
working to build deeper and more effective partnerships with other key centers of 
influence – includ ing China, India, and Russia, as well as increasingly influential 
nations such as Brazil, South Africa, and Indonesia – so that we can cooperate 
on issues of bilateral and global concern, with the recognition that power, in an 
interconnected world, is no longer a zero sum game (NSS-2010, p. 11)
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Whereas considering bilateral relations in particular,
We welcome Brazil’s leadership and seek to move beyond dated North-South 
divisions to pursue progress on bilateral, hemispheric, and global issues. Brazil’s 
macroeconomic success, coupled with its steps to narrow socioeconomic gaps, 
provide important lessons for countries throughout the Americas and Africa. We 
will encourage Brazilian efforts against illicit transnational networks. As guardian 
of a unique national environmental patrimony and a leader in renewable fuels, 
Brazil is an important partner in confronting global climate change and promoting 
energy security. And in the context of the G-20 and the Doha round, we will work 
with Brazil to ensure that economic development and prosperity is broadly shared. 
(NSS-2010, p. 53)
Will this come easily? Not so often and it will depend on the circumstances 
involved and mostly on US domestic policies. For the US, as much as pivotal States 
need to be engaged, they need to be contained as well. Brazilian political and 
economic goals will continue to suffer some restrictions, and the country should 
still pursue them into the framework of its other alliances of variable design. In 
the case of Brazil, as well as other nations, the hegemonic power looms in the 
world and it cannot be disregarded in any strategy. However, the US is not the 
only partner to be reckoned with. The dilemma is well presented by Vieira, 
Sometimes Brazil and US perceptions will converge and the dialogue will be easier, 
as on climate change. In other cases, we will have different perceptions, diagnoses, 
and solutions, as with Iran. What is true in each case, however, is that, to quote 
US Ambassador to Brazil Thomas Shannon, “The US needs to get used to the idea 
that, from now on, it will come across Brazil in places where it previously would 
not expect to find Brazil.” (VIEIRA, 2010, p. 7)
Final Thoughts
Still rifted by ideological polarizations, in particular in Brazil, bilateral 
relations with the US have grown stronger in the last decade. As China, India, 
and Russia, Brazil is viewed as a regional and global power that, in spite of 
lacking military power, is able to influence the political and strategic scenario. As 
Obama mentioned the need for the US to exercise its “smart power”, Brazil has 
been able to enlarge its influence in the world by making use of its soft power: 
alliances of variable design and a new diplomatic speech for the South. For the 
future, the core of Brazil-US bilateral relations will continue to go forward as 
both nations understand and respect each other s´ changing roles in the coming 
multipolar world. 
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abstract
The aim of this article is to examine Brazil and the United States bilateral relations from 
2003/2010 and their strategic patterns during the Presidency of Luis Inácio Lula da Silva. 
The goal is to understand the development of this dialogue in the 21st century and its 
previous background in the Post Cold War world, identifying its evolution and change 
due to Brazil’s growing regional and global role and US relative position.
resumo
O objetivo deste artigo é examinar as relações entre o Brasil e os Estados Unidos 2003 
e 2010 e os seus padrões estratégicos durante a presidência de Luis Inácio Lula da 
Silva. Busca-se compreender o desenvolvimento deste diálogo, no século 21 e sua formação 
anterior no mundo pós-Guerra Fria, identificando a sua evolução e transformação, devida 
ao crescimento do papel regional e global desempenhado pelo Brasil com relação aos 
Estados Unidos.
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